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Minimum wage legislation is frequently advocated in the belief that it
creates a more nearly equal distribution of income. A one—sector model of
general equilibrium is used to analyze a universally applicable minimum
wage, and a two—sector mQdel is used to analyze a minimum wage that is
only applied to certain industries. In both cases we find that a minimum
wage may well lower equality (as computed by the Gini index) if we consider
reasonable values for the parameters of these two models. In the absence
of unemployment compensation, equality can increase only if the elasticity
of substitution in production is quite low. In the one—sector case, how-
ever, equality necessarily rises if unemployment compensation is present
and sufficiently generous.1
INTRODUCTION
Minimum Wage legislation is frequently advocated in the belief that
it creates a more nearly equal distribution of income. In this paper we
investigate the positive economic question of the conditions under which
this belief is true. We find chat whether it is true depends on whether
the minimum wage is universally applicable, and in the case of a universally
applicable minimum wage, on the level of unemployment compensation.
In general we find that a legal minimum wage will actually reduce
income equality, unless the elasticity of substitution in production between
low—wage labor and other factors of production is fairly low, or unemploy-
ment compensation is sufficiently generous.
By investigating this issue, we do not mean to suggest that income
equality is necessarily desirable or equitable. Indeed, Robert Nozick
(1974, chapter 7) has recently demonstrated that distributive justice does
not require any particular state of income or wealth distribution, but
rather a process by which the economy moves from one state to another. In
other words, the proper criterion of justice does not ask how much an
individual has, but rather how he acquired what he has. Greater equality
can therefore actually be inequitable, depending on how the increase in
equality comes about. Nevertheless, the effect of a minimum wage law on
equality is an interesting economic question, to the extent that those who
advocate it regard equality as desirable (Mises 1963, 858).
In this paper, we measure equality with the Gini index, the ratio of
the area under the Lorenz curve to the area under the 45 degree line that2
represents perfect equality (Gini 1921). This index is, admittedly,
open to objections detailed by Newberry (1970). An alternative class of
indices has been proposed by Atkinson (1970). However, for many values
of Atkinson's parameter e ,hisindex registers perfect inequality if
even one person reports zero income. The Gini index, on the other hand,
is capable of differentiating between different percentages of the population
reporting no income. Since the Gini index is also easily computed and
familiar to economists, we will make do with it.
A ONE-SECTOR MODEL
First, we consider the effects of a universally applicable minimum
wage law, in a one—sector economy. For the sake of simplicity, we will
assume that there are two homogeneous factors, unskilled labor U and skilled
labor S ,whobetween them comprise the entire population, and that output
X is produced competitively by means of a constant returns to scale
production fucntion X =F(U,S). To simplify the analysis, we will ignore
the supply elasticities of U and S ,aswell as mobility between the two
groups.
We could instead couch our analysis in terms of "Labor" and "Capital."
However, since wages and salaries constitute the great majority of national
income, it seems more relevant to distinguish between different types of
labor that between labor and capital. If the reader is concerned about
non—labor factors, he may consider them within the context of the present
modelas being owned uniformly by the "skilled laborers."
Although in theory our competitive analysis would have to be modified
ifemployers are able to exert monopsony power, in practice few labor3
markets are sufficiently concentrated to permit such power (Bunting 1962,
3—14). Furthermore, even in the presence of monopsony power, a simple
minimum wage is unlikely to do much to produce the efficiency gains and
expanded employment that are possible in theory (Stigler 1946).
Let WaLd W be the wage rates paid to unskilled and skilled U S
labor respectively, taking the price of X as numeraire. Let k =IJW/Xand
1—k =SW/X be the relative shares of U and S in national income. We S
measure U and S as fractions of the total population, so that U + S =1
initially, when there is full employment.
The Lorenz curve in the absence of a minimum wage law is shown in
Figure 1.1 In this diagram, the entire population is arranged along the
horizontal axis from the lowest income individuals (the unskilled laborers)
to the highest income individuals (the skilled laborers). The vertical
axis measures percent of total income earned by individuals to the left of
any given value on the horizontal axis. Our initial Lorenz curve follows a
straight line from the point (0, 0) to (U, k), and then another straight
line to (1, 1).
Suppose now that a universally applicable and completely effective
minimum wage law is passed, preventing laborers from working (or what
amounts to the same thing, preventing employers from hiring them) if they
cannot cotand a certain minimum wage somewhat higher than the market
unskilled wage, say W +dW .Thislaw will throw unskilled workers out U U
of work until the marginal product of those remaining equals the minimum
wage. To the extent that workers embody human capital that is specific
11n thispaper we assume away life—cycle earnings patterns that generally
cause transitory income to be less equally distributed than the more
relevant concept of total human wealth (discounted lifetime earnings).
See Lillard (1977).Percent of Population
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to the firm they work for (such as hiring costs or specific training),
the unemployment effect will be lessened in the short run. (See Oi 1962.)
However, in the long runthefull unemployment will appear. In any case,
unskilled workers probably embody relatively little human capital, specific
or otherwise, so that there will be substantial unemployment even in the
short run. Thus, Brozen (1969) and Kosters and Welch (1972) find appreciable
short—run unemployment effects among teen—agers, and especially among
non—white teen—agers. We therefore believe our simple model captures a large
part of the truth.
In the absence of unemployment compensation, the unemployed make nothing,
so they are now at the very bottom of the income distribution, even below
the employed unskilled. The total share of unskilled, unemployed and employed
together, is now k +dk.It is well known (and will be demonstrated below
in passing) that dk will be negative if the elasticity of substitution
(Hicks 1957, 245) between the two factors is greater than unity, and
positive if it is less than unity. In the former case, illustrated in Figure
2, the new Lorenz curve will, be entirely below the original curve, so that
equality surely must decline by any measure. In the latter case, however,
the new Lorenz curve starts off below the original curve and then passes
above it, as shown in Figure 3.It is not at once obvious whether equality
has risen or fallen in this case.
In order to solve this problem we must explicitly compute the Cmi




Keeping in mind that dU is negative, the value of the Gini index as
modified by the minimum wage law is
G+dG= [(k+dk)(u+du) +(k+dk+l)S]/
=kU+ kdU + Udk + dkdU + kS + Sdk + S
=G+ dk + kdTJ + dkdU
The term dkdU is of only the second order of smalls, so we may ignore it if
dW is sufficiently small:
dG=dk+kdU . 2)
The demand curve for U will be the schedule of the marginal product
of U given the quantity of S available, that is, F(U, S). When W
goes up by dWu ,Ufalls by dU (see Figure 4). The slope of this curve
is F, the second partial derivative of F with respect to U, so we have
dW/dU=F U UU
By Euler's theorem we have UP + SF=0,sothat
uU US
dU/dW =—U/(SF) U US
=— [U/WI[x/ (SW) I[FF/(XF) 1
= —Ua/[W(1 —k)] U
EU —ciEW/(l —k), 3)
where =FF /(XF )isthe elasticity of substitution between U and us us
S,W=Fand W =Fare the marginal products of U and S ,and"E" U u S s
represents the logarithmic differentiation operator:7
EUd in U
=dU/U,etc.
Differentiation of X =F(U,S) gives





=k(EU+ EW -EX) U
=k[EW+(1 -k)EU]
=k (l—) EW . 5)
Equation 5) shows us why must be less than unity for the mimimuxn
wagelaw to raise the relative share of U. Since the unmployed receive
nothing, k (or k + dk) is at once the share of employed U and the share
of all U .Substituting3) and 5) into 2), we have
dG =[k(l—,)—kaU/(l—k)]EW
U
=k[(l—k) —(l+U—k)]EW 1(1—k). 6) U
Equation6) implies that "equality," at least as reckoned by the Gini. index,
will rise if and onlyif8
1-k 0< 7) 1 + U—k
The expression (1 —k)/(l+ U —k)is always less than 1 —k,since
the income share k of unskilled workers is necessarily less than their
population share U. Therefore a would have to be fairly low, in com-
parison to the remarkably robust Cobb—Douglas value of unity (Douglas 1976),
for equality to increase) For example, if unskilled are half the population
and make half as much as skilled workers, we will have
UW k= u
13W + SW u S
.25W = U









laufman and Foran (1968/71, 189—218) erroneously investigate the
share of the affected factor in order to determine whether or not the
legislation has increased equality. We have shown that if (1—k)/(1+U—k) <
a<1,equality will fall even though the share of the directly affected
factor rises.
Zucker (1973) finds estimates of the demand elasticity for low—wage
labor between —0.79 and —1.15. By (3), the elasticity of substitution
therefore would lie between .79(1—k) and 1.15(1—k), which is probably below
unity, in spite of the apparent robustness of the Cobb—Douglas formulation.9
so that a would have to be less than 4/7 for equality to rise.
The percentage change in the absolute share of unskilled labor is given
by
E(UW ) EU+EW U U
=[1—a/(l—k)]EW
This quantity is positive for a rise in W if and only if a <(3.—k)
Since we must have (1 —k)/(l+ U —k)<(1—k)<1,we may state that a
minimum wage law will raise equality only if it raises the absolute share of
U, and it wil]. raise the absolute share of U only if it raises the relative
share of U
It might be objected to the analysis of this section that the unemployment
will rotate among the directly affected group of workers, so that there will
not, in the long run, be an identifiable class of unemployed. In this case, it
would only be necessary for a to be less than 1 (a much more likely event
than a <(1—k]/[l+U—k])for equality to increase. However, this
objection confuses frictional unemployment with minimum wage unemployment. As
a rule, we would expect.unemployment caused by ordinary job turnover to pass
from worker to worker, while that caused by minimum wage legislation would not.
If there is even the slightest difference in the efficiency of different
unskilled workers, the burden of minimum wage unemployment will fall entirely
on the shoulders of the least efficient. Thus the resulting unemployment will
persistently afflict the already otherwise disadvantaged: the unschooled, the
inexperienced, teenagers, and those who have not mastered the majority language.10
Even if efficiency is uniformly distributed, the available jobs are likely
to be rationed by employers on the basis of non—efficiency considerations
that would ordinarily be overridden by market forces, such asrace, religion,
sex, ethnic origin, political affiliation, or kinship.
We therefore must conclude that although it is not impossible for a
universally applicable minimum wage to increase the equality of income dis-
tribution in the absence of unemployment compensation, it is notvery likely
to do so. In the event that it does actually raise equality, it is only
because the improved position of employed unskilled labor relative to skilled
labor outweighs the necessarily deteriorated position of unemployed unskilled
relative to employed unskilled. In any event there is always increased
inequality at the lower end of the income distribution.11
THE ONE—SECTORMODELWITHUNPLOYMENTCOMPENSATION
In the presence of unemployment compensation, the effect on equality
of a universally applicable minimum wage law will be somewhat different.
Suppose that the unemployed are compensated at the fraction a of the wage they
would obtain if they were employed, so that they receive aW .(Whetherthey
receive aW ,a(W+ dW ),ora(W + dW )(l —t)will not affect the results U U U U U
below, so long as dWis infinitessimal.) Although such compensation can
act as a strong subsidy to unemployment (Feldstein 1974), we will ignore these
supply effects, and assume that observed employment is affected only by the demand
effect of a minimum wage, provided a is less than unity.
We will assume that the compensation is paid for out of a proportional
income tax. While such a tax is likely not to be proportional in practice,
we make this assumption in order to investigate the distributional effects of
the minimum wage with unemployment compensation in isolation from the effect
of redistributive tax structures.
The unemployed receive _aWdU, and output becomes X+dX (where both dU
and dX are negative), so the income of the employed unskilled and skilled




Ignoringterms in the second order of smalls, this rate becomes12
t =—akEU
With unemployment compensation, the Lorenz curve in the presence of
a minimum wage law will pass from (0, 0) to (—dU, —akEU) to (U, k+dk) to
(1, 1), where we interpret k+dk as the modified share of all unskilled
workers, including the unemployed. The new Gini index is now
G + dG =[akETJdU+ (U +dU) (-akEU + k + dk)
++(1+k+dk)S1/4
Ignoring terms in the second order of sinalls and rearranging, we have
dG(l—a)kUEU + dk
The modified after—tax share of unskilled workers is now
-aW dU + (U+dU) (W +dW )(1+akEU)
k + dk =
x(1+EX)
U U 8)








= [1-k-(1-a)u(1+ U -k)1 9)13
This expression is positive if and only if
1—k
(l—a)(1+U—k)
If a is between zero and unity, we see that if a is small enough to
increase equality without compensation, it is necessarily small enough to
increase equality with compensation.
We also see that the more generous unemployment compensation is, the more
likely a minimumwageis to increase equality. In particular, as the fraction a
approaches unity, a universally applicable minimum wage becomes certain to
increase equality.
It does not follow, however, that generous unemployment compensation
necessarily increases the income of unskilled workers. Their total after
tax income N+dN is the numerator of the right—hand side of (8). Once
more expanding and ignoring terms in the second order of smalls, we have
dN =U[l—a(l+ak—a)1dW . 10) u 1—k u






Since a is bounded by zero and unity, we see that if a is less than 1—k,14
unskilled income necessarily rises, even if a equals zero. On the other
hand, if a is greater than (l—k)/k, unskilled income necessarily falls,
regardless of a.15
A TWO—SECTOR MODEL
Most minimum wage legislation is not universally applicable as we have
assuaed above. Although less qualified workers are effectively barred from
certain occupations, other occupations may remain open to them. Usually these
uncovered jobs are in fields such as agriculture, domestic service, small—
scale industry, and self employment. If the displaced workers prefer low—pay
jobs in these fields to unemployment, the effects of the minimum wage law will
be modified.2 In this section, we will ignore the possibility of unemploy-
ment compensation, in effect assuming that unemployment compensation is
unattractive in comparison to employment in the low—wage uncovered sector.
Let us assume that there are two sectors, producing outputs X and Y
competitively. Let m be the share of the X—industry in national income and
let f and g be the shares of unskilled labor in the income of the X and
Y sectors respectively. Let U ,U,S,andSbe the quantities of xyx y
unskilled and skilled labor used in the two industries, measured as fractions
of the total labor force (again taken to be the entire population), so that
U +U+S+S=U+S=1.Takethe salaries of the skilled workers as x y x y
the numeraire, and let Wand W be the wage rates for unskilled workers in x y
the two industries.Initially, W =
WY
=W<1
2See Brozen (1962) for an analysis of thestimulating effect minimum
wage rises have on the pool of domestic workers. Dropping out of the labor
force altogether to perform non—market household duties or leisure activities
may also be interpreted as entering an uncovered industry. Thus, Moore (1971)
finds that the increase in the minimum wage in .1961 seems to have lowered
the subsequent labor force participation of teenagers. We assume job turnover
in the covered sector to be low enough that speculativeunemployment of the
type Mincer (1976) dIscusses does not appear.
3Th1s model is essentially thatemployed by Jones (1965), Johnson (1969) and
Johnson and Mieszkowskj (1970). See McCufloch (1974) and the comments below,
however, for qualifying considerations in a special case.16
Let N be national income (P X + P y) and k, k ,andkbe the x y x y
shares of U, U ,andU in N. We then must have x y






m1+ (l—m)g . 13)
Figure 5 shows the initial distribution of income, before the minimum
wage is applied. In Figure 6, a minimum wage has been applied to the X sector,
raising the real wage in that industry, both absolutely and relative to the
wage in Y .Insteadof unemployment appearing, we assume now that unskilled
laborers are perfectly mobile so that those displaced by the minimum wage
immediately find work in the uncovered Y sector.
The initial value of the Gini index of equality is, as before,
G=k+s
After the minimum wage is introduced, we have
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Rearranging, ignoring terms in the second order of smalls, and using
U k =Uk ,weobtain xy yx
dG=kdU +(1+U)dk +(S+U)dk x x y xx
Now
dk =k[(1—k)EW + EU + (1—k )E(W 1w )] x x y x xx y
dk =k[(1—k)EW —(UIU )EU —kE(W 1W )]
y y yxy xx xy
whence
dG =k(1—k)EW + k (1 -k—U) E(W 1w ). 14)
y x xxy
We assume that the owners of both factors have the same marginal
propensity to consume each of the two goods so that redistributional effects
have no influence per se on the output mix. Let be the elasticity of
substitution in consumption between X and Y, and aand abe the x y
elasticities of substitution in production between U and S .(These
substitution elasticities are defined so as to be positive.) Then following
Harberger,4 we have the following system of equations relating small changes
in W ,S,U,and W/W y x x xy
4Harberger (1962, 226—7). We have substituted —(l—m)a for Harberger's
demand elasticity E, U for his "capital," and S for his "labor."19
(_(1_m)af \ (
(1—m)a(f—g) 1—f f \/ EW\
0
\E(W/W)=—(1—m)ag(l—g)—m(l—f)g mf(1_g)\)ES 15)
-/ a -1 1 /\ EU/
Thedeterminant of this system,
D =m(1_m)a(f_g)2+ (l-m)ag(1-g) + maf(1_f) > 0
is always positive. Using Cramer's rule, we have




D dG =m(l—m)a(f—g)[k (1—k—U )(f—g) —k(l—k)f]
E(W/W)
C X X xy
+ ma f(1—f)[—k U —k(1—k)] 17) x xx y
+ (1—m)ag(1—g)k(1—k—U).
This formula is valid to the extent that system (15) is valid. However,
in another paper (NcCufloch 1974) we have shown that if ais sufficiently
C
large in comparison to aand a ,andthe covered X industry is labor—
intensive, this system is invalid, since a minimum wage in the X industry,
even when dWis infinitessimal, will result in a discrete change in the
employment and output variables, rather than the irifinitessitnal changes
assumed by the equations. This problem arises when
(l—m)g[ma(l—f)(g—f) + a (l—g)(1.-mf) + maf(l—f)]/D, 18)20
which according to system (15) is the value of (EW —EP)/(EW —EW), is
negative.5When expression (18) is negative, a minimum wage in the X
industry will cause a discrete reduction in X output and employment and
mayevenclose down the X industry. We have madenoassumptions about how
the economy behaves outside a small neighborhood of the initial equilibrium,
so we cannot say for certain what will happen to equality in this case.
However, it seems likely that it will decline.
Expression (17) can have either sign, depending on the values of the
underlying parameters. The term in is always negative, so that if in
or is large enough, equality will surely fall. Since it is the only one
of the three terms that is determinate in sign, equality tends, if anything,
to fall in the two sector model, though this is at best a weak presumption.
In order to obtain a better feel for the likely effect of a minimum wage
in this model, we assign prior probability distributions to the values of the
basic parameters and compute a derived prior probability that the minimum
wage will reduce equality. To be sure, the derived prior will depend
critically on the assumed parameter priors. Nevertheless, this is a convenient
way to summarize our knowledge of a complex expression, one which could perhaps,
with experience, be applied to other problems as well.
The parameters f, g, m, and W may take on values between 0 and 1, so we
will consider the five values .1, .3, .5, .7, and .9 for these four parameters.
5misexpressionis the same as the right hand side of equation (14) on
p. 447 of Jones (1971), in the case of an infinitessimal distortion.
Jones, however, does not recognize the inapplicability of the differential
model when this expression is negative.21
The substitution elasticities a ,a,andamay take on values from
cx y
otoinfinity. Estimates of substitution elasticities often cluster about
unity, so we will want to center our substition elasticity distributions
around 1. The range .5 to 2 probably includes most reasonable estimates of
the a's, but since (17) is sensitive to extreme values of these three
parameters, we will also include .1 and 10. Thus we consider the five
values .1, .5, 1, 2, and 10 for each of the three substitution elasticities. In
ordernot to give too much weight to the extreme values of the seven basic
parameters,6 we assignprior probabilities of .1, .2, .4, .2, and .1 to the
five values of each parameter, respectively. Assuming independence between the
prior distributions of our parameters we can then easily compute the prior
probability of each of the 57 =78,275combinations of values. Expression
(17) was evaluated for each of these combinations, resulting in a derived
prior probability of .799 that equality will fall. (When expression (18) proved
negative, it was assumed that equality would fall regardless of the value of
(17). However, this perverse case only occurred with prior probability .015,
so its treatment did not have a major effect on the results.)
In order to test the sensitivity of the change in the Cmi index to the
extreme values of .1 and .9 that we allowed for f, g, in, and W and of .1 and
10 that we allowed for a ,a,anda ,wealso tried assigning the prior dis—
CX y
tribution 0, .25, .5, .25, and 0 to the five values of each of the seven
bdsic parameters. In effect, this eliminated the extreme values. In this
6U maybecalculated from in,f,g, and W using (11), (13), and
U =k[W+ k(l-W)].22
case expression (18) was never negative, and the derived prior probability
of equality falling rose to .906.
The effect on income equality of a minimum wage law that is not
universally applicable depends on the technological characteristics, importance,
and factor intensities of the covered and uncovered sectors. This will vary
with the provisions of the particular legislation under consideration. However,
we may conclude that it would take a fairly unusual combination of parameters
to prevent such a minimum wage from reducing income equality.23
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